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Foreword 
 
Shelby D. Green 
 
The American dream turned into a nightmare.  Since early 
in the last century, the goal of homeownership played a promi-­
nent part in the American dream³one that the Federal Gov-­
ernment encouraged through various policies and programs, 
including subsidies, tax benefits, mortgage insurance, and the 
creation of the secondary mortgage market.  These programs 
facilitated home ownership by, among other things, increasing 
liquidity to loan originators.  The rate of homeownership 
climbed slowly, albeit steadily and safely.  But then came the 
subprime market.  Homeownership leaped³but with dire con-­
sequences.  What drove this market was not the provision of 
the stability and security of a home, but profits at the expense 
of the dreamers.  Loans with onerous terms were offered to the 
most precarious and least sophisticated borrowers.  The mil-­
lions of defaults by these hapless borrowers roiled the mortgage 
and financial markets.  Scores of commercial banks that had 
originated the improvident and poorly secured loans failed.  
Venerable investment banks³such as Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers, and Bear Stearns³that had invested heavily into 
mortgage-­backed securities collapsed.  The packaging of mort-­
gage-­backed securities and derivatives by these investment 
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banks, together with promises of high returns and guarantees, 
was laudable, to be sure.  But with the collapse, these issuers 
defaulted on billions of dollars of promised investment re-­
turns³and investors lost billions.  Those we trusted, those 
with expertise and insight³the economists, the regulators, and 
the bankers³failed to see the signs of the impending disaster 
and thus failed to divert us from this course.  The role of hu-­
man judgment waned as mathematical models designed to pre-­
dict market outcomes seemed infallible.  Few suspected that 
the housing bubble would burst.  Even as foreclosures accele-­
rated and housing prices slipped, the regulators merely 
shrugged.  They did not see or feel the fateful vortex of ruin 
swirling. 
There are obvious parallels in history, situations where a 
confluence of greed, excess, and misguided philosophy also 
brought the nation to its knees.  The Great Depression and the 
savings and loan association debacle of the 1980s stand out.  In 
each of these prior instances, legislators and regulators were 
each determined to put into place safeguards against a recur-­
rence.  Yet each time, after a period of relative stability, the 
regulators relaxed their safeguards, believing that we could 
once again trust in the integrity of market actors and the ra-­
tionality of the market itself.  The actors, for their part, seemed 
to have all labored under a common myopia.  They acted with-­
out the prudence of knowing the underlying worth of their pur-­
chases, without the constraints of traditional capital and risk 
requirements, and without regard for market history. 
The Symposium, Real Property, Mortgages, and the Econ-­
omy: A Call for Ethics and Reforms, presented jointly by the 
PACE LAW REVIEW and the Pace University School of Law, 
L.L.M. Program in Real Estate Law on March 20, 2009, offered 
a dialogue on the existing philosophies underlying the regula-­
tion of the economy in general and the mortgage financing in-­
dustry in particular, and discussed the need for a new ethic to 
govern and motivate participants in the lending industry.  We 
considered ways that the economy might escape the ruthless 
vortex that was created by hope, fear, and cupidity. 
In this Symposium issue of PACE LAW REVIEW, the articles 
set out to examine how we got to this point, yet again, and to 
ponder how to set us on a safe course far away from another 
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near ruin.  My own article1 attempts to set the stage for the 
other articles presented herein.  It describes the frightening 
magnitude of the crises³in the mortgage market, the courts, 
and the financial markets³affecting our nation, as well as the 
world, and it identifies the three ends that should be the focus 
of our national response: preserving homeownership, protecting 
the integrity of the markets, and avoiding the moral hazard.  
The themes underlying these goals, now seemingly obvious to 
many, yet elusive to most in the last few years, are taken up in 
various ways by the other authors in this issue. 
Professor Mark A. Edwards2 examines the history of bank-­
ing in the United States and reveals how our regulatory 
schemes³such as the tightening and loosening of constraints 
on banks and other market participants³have almost mechan-­
ically responded to the competing forces of ideology on the one 
hand, and pragmatism on the other.  The ideology of free mar-­
kets had reigned until some crisis requiring pragmatic res-­
ponses occurred.  Understanding these historical patterns 
should inform the development of a regulatory scheme that re-­
flects a constant and consistent strategy that considers the im-­
peratives and lessons of history. 
Professor Vincent Di Lorenzo3 brings home these concerns 
DQG H[SODLQV LQ UHDO WHUPV KRZ &RQJUHVV·V DLP WR FUHDWH D
more-­or-­less free market in mortgages by lifting regulatory 
constraints on national banks and thrifts, and by moving to-­
ZDUGRIIHULQJRQO\´JXLGDQFHVµGLGQRWIXOO\FRQVLGHUWKHDYe-­
nues for the self-­interested and opportunistic conduct that such 
a policy would create.  Banks almost uniformly ignored the 
guidances and made loans without consideration of a borrow-­
HU·VDELOLW\WRUHSD\HPSOR\LQJDZKROHUDQJHRIH[RWLFDQGLn-­
scrutable mortgage products.  Not only did this hands-­off regu-­
latory model not work to improve homeownership, with the 
millions of foreclosures and the ripple effects of this phenome-­
non throughout the economy³including a drop in the gross 
 
1. Shelby D. Green, Disquiet on the Home Front: Disturbing Crises in the 
1DWLRQ·V0DUNHWVDQG,QVWLWXWLRQV, 30 PACE L. REV. 7 (2009). 
2. Mark A. Edwards, Nationalization, De-­Nationalization, Re-­
Nationalization: Some Historical and Comparative Perspective, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 124 (2009).  
3. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Unsafe Loans in a Deregulated U.S. Mortgage 
Market, 30 PACE L. REV. 154 (2009). 
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domestic product, consumer spending, and high unemploy-­
ment³it created a net loss. 
Navid Vazire4 continues with an analysis of the securitiza-­
tion process, explaining how it provided liquidity which 
enabled lenders to make loans to a greater number of people 
and to people who otherwise would have been shut out of the 
market.  He also explains how the securitization process radi-­
cally changed the incentives of lenders³from expecting returns 
from safe investments over time, to expecting immediate gains 
from up-­front processing fees.  As a consequence, lenders en-­
gaged in practices that are now described as predatory.  They 
targeted the most vulnerable and precarious borrowers, who 
already posed a risk of likely default, and this risk passed onto 
investors in the securitization products. 
Something other than sheer greed and short-­sightedness 
must account for the financial near-­collapse.  Professor Robin 
Paul Malloy5 considers the extent to which there are systemic 
flaws and fallacies in economic philosophy.  He comments that 
the UHOLDQFH XSRQ $GDP 6PLWK·V ´LQYLVLEOH KDQGµ SKLORVRSK\
has decidedly been shown as an incorrect decision.  Such re-­
liance must cease once one accepts the fact that markets are 
not self-­correcting.  Indeed, if we move away from the concep-­
WLRQ RI ´PDUNHWµ DV D GHVLUDEOH HQG LQ LWVHOI³the negative ef-­
IHFWV IDOOLQJ RQ DOO WKRVH LQ WKH ZDNH RI DQRWKHU·V SXrsuit of 
profit³toward something that enables the arrangement of ex-­
change networks to achieve cost-­effective goals and objectives, 
then the need for regulation and oversight to confirm a mar-­
NHW·VDELOLW\WRHIIHFWXDWHWKHVHHQGV LV LPSHUDWLYH -XGJPHQW
and accountability must be reintroduced into market transac-­
tions. 
Professor Prentiss Cox6 believes that the greatest regulato-­
ry failure in this crisis was the shift in regulatory focus toward 
the fiscal soundness of banking entities, and away from con-­
sumer protection.  In fact, federal regulatory agencies enacted 
 
4. Navid Vazire, Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the Sub-­
prime Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV. 41 
(2009). 
5. Robin Paul Malloy, Mortgage Market Reform and the Fallacy of Self-­
Correcting Markets, 30 PACE L. REV. 79 (2009). 
6. Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in Fi-­
nancial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279 (2009). 
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regulations that preempted many effective state consumer pro-­
tection laws.  Consumer protection at the federal level should 
include more than mere disclosure, but limits on lending prac-­
tices should be prescribed and aggressive enforcement of con-­
sumer protection laws must be undertaken.  Allen H. Schein-­
er,7 while recognizing the need for greater regulatory oversight, 
believes that the best approach would be to develop uniform, 
national standards, rather than to rely upon individual state 
laws.  He believes that state laws, while addressing predatory 
lending³particularly those laws that have recently been 
enacted³purport to impose liability upon assignees of mort-­
gages, not because of any objective culpability, but solely as a 
consequence of having purchased a loan.  These laws are thus 
based upon newly-­crafted definitions of unfair trade practices, 
and as such, risk market uncertainty and threaten to upset the 
carefully crafted national policies, as reflected in recent 
amendments to banking laws.  Mr. Scheiner argues that a se-­
curitized transaction is a national affair. 
Banks and homeowners were not the only ones to be sent 
reeling by the financial crisis.  In fact, as Suzanne M. Garcia8 
describes, reckless and improvident lending practices have 
wreaked havoc in the title insurance industry as well, leading 
to revenue shortages and reductions in staff.  Not only do title 
examinations now take longer to complete, but they have be-­
come more complicated as many states have enacted procedur-­
al requirements for making loans in the first place and for pur-­
suing foreclosures.  The failure to comply may mean that a loan 
will be avoided or that title will fail, thus giving rise to claims 
under the title policy.  The specter of such claims is rather 
large, particularly because an examination of the cold land 
records cannot reveal the circumstances of a failure to comply 
with borrower protection requirements.  Marvin N. Bagwell9 
describes how the whole process of securitization and the lack 
of regulatory oversight provided an environment for more and 
more schemes designed to fleece the next person down the line.  
 
7. Allen H. Scheiner, State Subprime Lending Litigation and Federal 
Preemption: Toward a National Standard, 30 PACE L. REV. 253 (2009). 
8. Suzanne M. Garcia, A Glance at the Impact of the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis on the Title Insurance Industry, 30 PACE L. REV. 233 (2009). 
9. Marvin N. Bagwell, &DQ·W/LYH:LWKRXW$LU 7LWOH ,QVXUDQFH DQG WKH
Bursting of the Real Estate Bubble, 30 PACE L. REV. 180 (2009). 
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These circumstances enabled the denials or finger-­pointing by 
those who kept silent when they should have declared that the 
WUDQVDFWLRQV´VWLQNWRKLJKKHDYHQµ 
6R IDU WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V UHVSRQVH WR WKLV JUDYH
crisis has been a massive infusion of capital³including loans to 
ailing banks, purchases of bank stock, reduction of the Federal 
5HVHUYH·V GLVFRXQW UDWH loan modification programs, and res-­
cues of failing banks.  These responses, though, seem to be ad 
hoc, developed on the fly, as if responding to a sudden casual-­
ty³an act of God.  But who should pay for these efforts?  How 
should actors be put on notice of their liability for future disas-­
ters?  Professor Mehmet K. Konar-­Steenberg10 identified paral-­
lels to another national disaster that required massive and sus-­
tained government involvement to remedy.  This earlier 
response, CERCLA,11 involved a comprehensive scheme to hold 
all potentially responsible parties liable for active conduct as 
well as for the failure to address conduct that could produce 
harm.  In the current disaster, the range of potentially respon-­
sible parties would quite fairly begin with the loan originators, 
extend to credit ratings agencies, and also include investment 
bankers.  Professor Konar-­Steenberg notes that this class 
might be even broader. 
The theme that seems to pervade the articles in this issue 
of the PACE LAW REVIEW is the need to reign in the baser hu-­
man instincts³those that manifest themselves in greed, undue 
risk-­taking, and folly³and to introduce higher norms of hones-­
ty, prudence, and judgment.  These themes will surely inform 
legislators and regulators as they seek to adopt measures to 
make the mortgage and financial worlds safe again. 
 
 
10. Mehmet K. Konar-­Steenberg, A Superfund Solution for an Economic 
Love Canal, 30 PACE L. REV. 310 (2009). 
11. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006). 
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